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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Rodney Gene Blackburn, Jr., appeals from the district court’s order 
denying his petition for post-conviction relief. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Blackburn pleaded guilty to felony violation of a no-contact order.  (See 
R., pp. 5, 31-32.)  He was sentenced to four years prison with one year fixed.  
(R., pp. 31-32.) 
 Blackburn filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging, among other 
things, that “trial counsels[1] advice to forego filing a direct appeal from his 
conviction and instead file a motion for rule 35 was faulty advice,” violating his 
6th amendment rights.2  (R., p. 7.)  Blackburn’s petition, the sole source of 
relevant facts in the record on appeal, explained his claim as follows: 
This is an issue where counsels advice has caused petitioner the 
loss of a guaranteed constitutional right to challenge his conviction 
on direct appeal. In the instant case petitioner look toward his 
counsel for guidance. Counsel in this case neglected to discuss 
with the petitioner the appellate process or the ramifications of not 
filing an appeal. Instead he said, “An appeal is not necessary” and 
“that a Rule 35 would be more appropriate”. After petitioner 
became more versed of the appellate process, he finds several 
                                            
1  Quotations from Blackburn’s petition will be sic throughout. 
 
2 Blackburn’s other post-conviction allegations were that “it was ineffective 
assistance of counsel for his attorney to ignore the phone calls to his office, 
where petitioner was requesting for counsel to meet with him to review the 
information in the PSI,” and that “the presentence investigator or other court 
official has violated his right to confidentiality and disclosure by allowing 
information from his PSI to be mixed in with another defendants PSI.”  (R., pp. 7-
8.)  These claims were summarily dismissed below, and Blackburn has not 
challenged their dismissal on appeal.  (R., p. 57; see Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-9.)  
 2 
things wrong with his attorneys advice. First the laws of this country 
provide for every convicted individual the right to a direct appeal. 
The petitioner contends why would he not avails himself of this 
right as he had absolutely nothing to lose by appealing and 
possible much to gain. Therefore counsels advice to not appeal is 
ineffective assistance and self-serving. 
 
(R., p. 7.)3 
 Regarding the sole issue now on appeal, the court found that Blackburn 
provided “no facts to show that counsel’s advice not to appeal was deficient” due 
to “inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, … other shortcomings 
capable of objective evaluation,” or was “otherwise not reasonable.”  (R., pp. 49, 
56.)  This claim, along with the remainder of Blackburn’s petition, was therefore 
summarily dismissed.  (R., pp. 53-61.) 
Blackburn timely appealed.  (R., pp. 62-65, 80-83.) 
  
                                            
3 To note a secondary issue, Blackburn also claimed that he  
took issue “with trial counsel because the very reason counsel cited for not filing 
the notice of appeal was the presentation of a Rule 35, of which he did not do.”  
(R., p. 7.)  Blackburn’s counsel states on appeal that the Rule 35 motion was in 
fact filed, but contends upon information and belief that the motion was untimely, 
unsupported, and ultimately denied.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 2, n. 1.)  In any event, 
the motion and any documents pertaining to it are not in the appellate record, 
making its timeliness and disposition unclear.  (See R.)  Blackburn further states 
that he “is not moving to augment the [appellate] record with [those documents], 
nor would it be proper to consider them in this appeal.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 2, n. 
1.)  As a result, this response will only address the sole issue Blackburn raises 
on appeal—his trial counsel’s allegedly deficient advice regarding the necessity 




Blackburn states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing Mr. Blackburn’s 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
Has Blackburn failed to show the district court erred by summarily dismissing his 




Blackburn Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Dismissing His Claim 
That His Counsel Was Ineffective For Advising Him Not To Appeal, Because He 
Has Not Shown That This Was Deficient Performance, And Has Not Shown That 




The district court summarily dismissed Blackburn’s claims for post-
conviction relief.  (R., pp. 56-61.)  Regarding the ineffective-assistance issue now 
on appeal, the district court held that trial counsel’s advice not to file a direct 
appeal was a “strategic decision” not to be second-guessed, and further found 
that there were no facts showing that counsel’s advice was deficient or otherwise 
unreasonable.  (R., p. 56.) 
On appeal, Blackburn contends that his “counsel did not discuss the 
ramifications of not filing” a direct appeal, and claims that this “alone establishes 
a genuine issue of material fact in regard to deficient performance because, if 
liberally construed in Mr. Blackburn’s favor, it demonstrates trial counsel did not 
fulfill his duty to consult with Mr. Blackburn.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-7.)4  
Blackburn further argues that advice to file a Rule 35 motion instead of an 
appeal was “objectively unreasonable.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)  Blackburn 
contends that the advice was also presumptively prejudicial to him, because “but 
                                            
4 Blackburn also alleged in a petition heading that “TRIAL COUNSEL COERCED 
PETITIONER INTO FOREGOING FILING A NOTICE OF APPEAL,” but there 
are no non-conclusory facts in the record showing any coercion.  (See R., pp. 4-
9.)  Blackburn appears to have abandoned his coercion theory on appeal.  (See 
Appellant’s brief.) 
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for the erroneous advice about Rule 35 being a valid alternative to the direct 
appeal, he would have exercised his right to appeal.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 8.)   
 Blackburn’s claims fail. The record shows that counsel did not perform 
deficiently, in fact consulted with Blackburn about whether to file an appeal, and 
Blackburn did not instruct counsel to file an appeal.  Further, even if counsel 
performed deficiently, Blackburn has not shown any presumptive prejudice, 
because he has not shown it reasonably probable that but for the allegedly 
deficient advice he would have appealed.  Neither has Blackburn shown any 
other grounds for prejudice.  The district court thus correctly summarily 
dismissed Blackburn’s petition for post-conviction relief. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 Summary dismissal of a post-conviction claim “is appropriate only if there 
exists no genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in the applicant’s favor, 
would entitle him to the requested relief.”  Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho 878, 880, 
187 P.3d 1253, 1255 (Ct. App. 2008).  If such a genuine factual issue is 
established, “an evidentiary hearing must be conducted.”  Id. at 880-81, 187 
P.3d at 1255-56.  On a review of summary dismissal, this Court examines the 
record “to determine whether the trial court correctly found that there existed no 
genuine issue of material fact and that the State was entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Id. at 881, 187 P.3d at 1256.  Facts and reasonable inferences 
are construed in favor of the non-moving party; however, this Court does “not 
give evidentiary value to mere conclusory allegations that are unsupported by 
admissible evidence.”  Id. 
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C. Blackburn Has Failed To Show His Counsel Was Ineffective For Advising 
Him Not To Appeal, Because He Has Not Shown That This Was Deficient 
Performance Or Prejudicial To Him 
 
 A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to counsel and to counsel’s 
“reasonably effective assistance.”  U.S. Const. amend. VI; Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  To prove that counsel was ineffective, a 
defendant must satisfy a two-prong test and show both that 1) “counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and 2) “there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–96.  A 
court’s “scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential” on review; 
therefore, a reviewing court “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”  Id. at 
689.  Accordingly, counsel’s tactical and strategic decisions “will not be second-
guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, 
ignorance of relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation.”  
Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231, 233, 880 P.2d 261, 263 (Ct. App. 1994). 
 In the “vast majority” of cases defense counsel will have a duty to consult 
with the defendant regarding whether to appeal.  Roe v. Flores–Ortega, 528 U.S. 
470, 485 (2000).  In doing so, as is always the case, counsel’s representation 
must meet an “objective standard of reasonableness.”  See id.; Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 688.  But ultimately, the choice whether to appeal rests with the 
defendant.  Labelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 119, 937 P.2d 427, 431 (Ct. App. 
1997) (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); see also Flores–
 7 
Ortega, 528 U.S. at 485 (“Like the decision whether to appeal, the decision 
whether to plead guilty (i.e., waive trial) rested with the defendant….).  
Accordingly, as a general rule “a lawyer who disregards specific instructions from 
the defendant to file a notice of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally 
unreasonable.”  Flores–Ortega, 528 U.S. at 477. 
 Where a defendant’s appeal wishes are unclear, the Flores–Ortega 
decision gives specific guidance.  Id.  There, the Court started with Strickland’s 
first prong and specifically rejected finding “as a constitutional matter, that in 
every case counsel’s failure to consult with the defendant about an appeal is 
necessarily unreasonable, and therefore deficient.”  Id. at 479 (emphasis in 
original).  Instead, the Flores–Ortega Court held that counsel “has a 
constitutionally imposed duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal” 
where there was reason to think a rational defendant would want an appeal, or 
where the defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel he was interested in 
appealing.  Id. at 480.  The Court found that in those circumstances, failure to 
consult with the defendant about an appeal results in a presumptive finding that 
counsel’s performance was deficient.  See id. at 479-480.  To “consult,” as 
defined by Flores–Ortega, “convey[s] a specific meaning—advising the 
defendant about the advantages and disadvantages of taking an appeal, and 
making  a reasonable effort to discover the defendant’s wishes.”  Id. at 478. 
As for Strickland’s second prong, the Flores–Ortega Court held that an 
unjustified failure to consult about appealing could also be presumptively 
prejudicial, as it led to a “denial of the entire judicial proceeding itself, which a 
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defendant wanted at the time and to which he had a right.”  Id. at 481-83.  
However, the Flores–Ortega Court only afforded this presumption in a particular 
circumstance: it “[held] that, to show prejudice in these circumstances, a 
defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s deficient failure to consult with him about an appeal, he would have 
timely appealed.”  Id. at 484 (emphasis added).  The Court likewise held that “[i]f 
the defendant cannot demonstrate that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, 
he would have appealed, counsel’s deficient performance has not deprived him 
of anything, and he is not entitled to relief.”  Id. 
1. Counsel’s Advice To Blackburn Was Not Deficient Performance 
 
 Here, Blackburn’s allegations that counsel advised him to file a Rule 35 
motion as opposed to a direct appeal do not establish a viable claim of deficient 
performance.  Blackburn alleges that counsel discussed with him, advised him 
against filling an appeal that counsel deemed “not necessary,” and advised that 
he thought that a Rule 35 motion would be more appropriate.  (R., p. 7.)  
Blackburn was free to disregard this advice and instruct his counsel to file an 
appeal.  He did not.  (See R., p. 7.)  Given that the ultimate authority whether to 
appeal rested with Blackburn, his counsel’s advice not to do so was not deficient 
simply because Blackburn now disagrees with that advice.   Moreover, measured 
advice that a Rule 35 motion “would be more appropriate” than an appeal 
suggests counsel evaluated both options, recommended a course of action 
based on those options, and concluded that an appeal was either unnecessary, 
or less appropriate, or both.  Second-guessing that conclusion does not mean, 
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as the district court put it, that the advice itself was “based on inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of 
objective evaluation.”  (R., pp. 49, 56 (citing Howard, 126 Idaho at 233, 880 P.2d 
at 263).)  Accordingly, counsel’s advice not to appeal should be analyzed under 
the “strong presumption” that it fell “within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance” and by that metric, would not be deficient.  See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
 Moreover, Blackburn pleaded guilty, which “waive[d] all non-jurisdictional 
defects and defenses, whether constitutional or statutory, in prior proceedings.” 
State v. Al–Kotrani, 141 Idaho 66, 69, 106 P.3d 392, 395 (2005).  Blackburn’s 
plea thus limited him to challenging his sentence on appeal, and it is unlikely that 
he could have successfully persuaded this Court that a four-year sentence, with 
only one-year fixed—for his third felony conviction—was excessive.  (See PSI, p. 
17.)  Blackburn’s limited options and the posture of this case would therefore 
only heighten the strong presumption that counsel’s advice to pursue a Rule 35 
motion was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. 
Blackburn presents two arguments that his counsel performed deficiently 
by advising him not to appeal.  First, he cites to Flores–Ortega and argues that 
“trial counsel did not fulfill his duty to consult with Mr. Blackburn as that duty has 
been defined by the United States Supreme Court.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-7.)  
This argument fails, because Blackburn’s counsel fulfilled that duty.  Flores–
Ortega defines “consult” as “advising the defendant about the advantages and 
disadvantages of taking an appeal, and making a reasonable effort to discover 
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the defendant’s wishes.”  Flores–Ortega, 528 U.S. at 478.  The facts as alleged 
by Blackburn are that “Counsel in this case neglected to discuss with the 
petitioner the appellate process or the ramifications of not filing an appeal. 
Instead he said, ‘An appeal is not necessary’ and “that a Rule 35 would be more 
appropriate’.”  (R., p. 7 (emphasis added).)   
 By this account there was a consultation about an appeal: counsel and 
Blackburn had a discussion; during that discussion counsel advised Blackburn 
regarding whether to file an appeal; counsel advised that filing an appeal was not 
necessary; and, counsel recommended an alternative course of action.  Advice 
that an appeal is “not necessary,” and that filing a Rule 35 motion was a better 
course of action, is necessarily a statement about the advantages of not 
appealing, or disadvantages of appealing, even if counsel did not use those 
exact words.  Further, there is no evidence in the record, nor does Blackburn 
allege, that counsel did not make a reasonable effort to discover the defendant’s 
wishes.  (See R., pp. 4-9.)  Thus, while Blackburn might retrospectively disagree 
with counsel’s advice whether to appeal, that does not mean that no advice was 
given, or that a consultation about appealing did not take place. 
 Given that there was a consultation about an appeal, Flores–Ortega itself 
“easily answer[s]” the issue here: Blackburn’s counsel would have performed “in 
a professionally unreasonable manner only by failing to follow the defendant’s 
express instructions with respect to an appeal.”  Flores–Ortega, 528 U.S. at 478.  
Blackburn has not alleged that he gave express instructions to his counsel during 
or after their consultation, nor is there any evidence of instructions to appeal, 
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express or otherwise.5  (See R., pp. 4-9.)  Accordingly, because there was a 
consultation about an appeal, but no express instructions from Blackburn to file 
such an appeal, Blackburn fails to show that counsel performed deficiently based 
on Flores–Ortega. 
Blackburn also advances the theory that counsel’s advice was deficient 
because “a Rule 35 motion is not an alternative to a direct appeal,” and “[a]s 
such, trial counsel’s advice to Mr. Blackburn – to pursue a Rule 35 motion 
instead of a direct appeal – was objectively unreasonable advice.”  (Appellant’s 
brief, p. 7 (emphasis in original, citing State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 
159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007).)  
This argument fails to show deficient performance.  Because while it is 
clear that Rule 35 is not the same procedural mechanism as an appeal, it is not 
likewise clear that advice to pursue a Rule 35 motion, in this case, would have 
been deficient advice.  As noted above, Blackburn pleaded guilty, which waived 
all “non-jurisdictional defects and defenses, whether constitutional or statutory, in 
                                            
5 This fact distinguishes this case from Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356, 883 
P.2d 714 (1994), which Blackburn cites in his briefing.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 8.)  
There, it was “undisputed … that Beasley advised his trial counsel of his wish to 
appeal his conviction.”  Id. at 360, 883 P.2d at 718.  Moreover, there, “[t]he 
record also clearly show[ed] that trial counsel, and the public defender who 
assumed Beasley’s representation after the entry of his judgment of conviction, 
understood that Beasley desired to appeal.”  Id.  The Beasley Court concluded, 
“[h]aving determined that Beasley’s counsel either neglected or refused to file an 
appeal despite Beasley’s request, … that ineffective assistance of counsel 
deprived Beasley of his opportunity to appeal and that prejudice is presumed 
from this deficient performance.”  Id. at 362, 883 P.2d at 720.  Here, there is no 
evidence that Blackburn ever advised his counsel he wished to appeal, nor any 
evidence that his counsel ignored such a request.  (See R.)  Thus, consistent 
with the rules set forth in Flores–Ortega, Blackburn would not be entitled to the 
presumption of prejudice that Beasley was afforded.  See 528 U.S. at 477-78. 
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prior proceedings.”  Al–Kotrani, 141 Idaho at 69, 106 P.3d at 395.  In light of his 
limited appeal-issue options and the sentence Blackburn received, a Rule 35 
motion, practically assessed, likely presented a more viable chance of success—
which is precisely why, one presumes, counsel recommended it.  In sum, 
regardless of the legal differences between a Rule 35 motion and an appeal, 
Blackburn has not shown that the advice to pursue the former instead of the 
latter was at all deficient. 
Because Blackburn has not shown counsel performed deficiently, the 
district court correctly dismissed his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. 
2. Even Assuming That Counsel Performed Deficiently, Blackburn 
Has Not Shown It Reasonably Probable That But For Counsel’s 
Allegedly Deficient Advice, He Would Have Appealed; Thus, 
Blackburn Fails To Show That Any Deficient Performance Was 
Prejudicial 
 
 Even if Blackburn has shown that counsel’s advice to him constituted 
deficient performance, he must still show it was prejudicial to him.  See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  He has not done so. 
First, Blackburn has not shown any particularized prejudice arising from 
the advice to file a Rule 35 motion.  In his petition, Blackburn seems to claim 
counsel’s advice was prejudicial because “why would he not avails himself of [his 
right to appeal] as he had absolutely nothing to lose by appealing and possible 
much to gain.”  (R., p. 7.)  Or in other words, Blackburn appears to say that 
advice not to appeal was prejudicial because an appeal would come at no direct 
cost to him, and there was a chance of receiving a reduced sentence. 
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The problem with finding prejudice based on these grounds is twofold.  
First, doing so ignores the opportunity cost of an appeal, and undercuts the value 
of a Rule 35 motion.  While Blackburn’s appeal would come at no out-of-pocket 
cost to him, that does not mean that appealing would be costless or that the Rule 
35 motion would be ill-advised—at the very least, filing an appeal instead of the 
motion would necessarily come at the motion’s expense. 
 Second, this argument fails because it finds prejudice in a circumstance 
that would always be present in indigent cases.  If advice not to file a “free” or 
“nothing-to-lose” appeal opens a door to prejudice, then every indigent defendant 
could claim such advice is prejudicial, regardless of whether it is actually good 
advice.  Creating an omnipresent prejudice standard not only goes against 
Flores–Ortega—which held that in unique cases defense counsel need not even 
consult about an appeal to be effective—but Strickland, where the Court held 
that “a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the 
reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular 
case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.”  Flores–Ortega, 528 U.S. at 
479-80; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 
 On appeal, Blackburn appears to allege only presumptive prejudice based 
on the per se rule found in Flores–Ortega.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-9 (citing 
Flores–Ortega, 528 U.S. at 478).)  To prevail on that theory and show that a 
failure to consult about an appeal is presumptively prejudicial, “a defendant must 
demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient 
failure to consult with him about an appeal, he would have timely appealed.”  
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Flores–Ortega, 582 U.S. at 484.  Here, even assuming the consultation was 
inadequate, no facts would support a per se demonstration of prejudice. There is 
no evidence in Blackburn’s petition showing he positively would have appealed 
but for his counsel’s advice, let alone facts that show a reasonable probability of 
it.  (See R., p. 7.) 
 Blackburn argues to the contrary, and points to the rhetorical question he 
raised in his petition for post-conviction relief: 
After petitioner became more versed of the appellate process, he 
finds several things wrong with his attorneys advice. First the laws 
of this country provide for every convicted individual the right to a 
direct appeal. The petitioner contends why would he not avails 
himself of this right as he had absolutely nothing to lose by 
appealing and possible much to gain. Therefore counsels advice 
not to appeal is ineffective assistance and self-serving. 
 
(R., p. 7 (emphasis added, grammar original).)  Blackburn reasons that 
“[a]lthough framed as a rhetorical question, what Mr. Blackburn alleged is, but for 
the erroneous advice about Rule 35 being a valid alternative to the direct appeal, 
he would have exercised his right to appeal ‘as he had absolutely nothing to lose 
and possibl[y] much to gain.’”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 8 (citing R., p. 7).) 
However, even charitably reading Blackburn’s rhetorical question does not 
establish a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s advice not to appeal, 
Blackburn would have appealed.  His question, unpacked in context, appears to 
be post-hoc criticism of counsel’s advice that an appeal was “not necessary.”  
Because Blackburn had a statutory right to an appeal, and subsequently deemed 
it a low-risk, high-return strategy, his petition seems to say that in hindsight 
 15 
appealing would have made perfect sense—“why would he not avail[] himself of 
this right,” he asks.  (See R., p. 7.) 
But Blackburn never stated below, as he argues now, that but for that 
allegedly bad advice “he would have exercised his right to appeal.”  (See R., p. 7; 
Appellant’s brief, p. 8.)  Instead, Blackburn’s conclusion following his rhetorical 
question was simply that, in light of the now-apparent merits of appealing, the 
advice not to appeal was “ineffective assistance and self-serving.”  (R., p. 7.)  
Additionally, there is no reason to think that Blackburn’s skeptical appraisal of 
counsel’s advice even existed at the time the advice was given—per Blackburn, 
he determined his attorney gave incorrect advice only “[a]fter [Blackburn] 
became more versed of the appellate process.”  (R., p. 7.)  Accordingly, 
Blackburn cannot bridge the gap between his post-conviction criticism of 
counsel’s advice, and the standard he must now meet: showing evidence that 
but for that advice, it is reasonably probable that he would have acted any 
differently at the time it was given.  He accordingly cannot show per se, 
presumptive prejudice. 
Blackburn has not shown facts establishing a reasonable probability that 
he would have appealed but for counsel’s advice—thus, any failure to consult 
would not have been presumptively prejudicial.  Moreover, Blackburn has not 
shown any other prejudice from counsel’s recommendation to file a Rule 35 
motion.  Because Blackburn’s allegations fail to establish deficient performance 
or prejudice, he cannot show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.  




 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the 
district court. 
 DATED this 1st day of November, 2016. 
 
       
 _/s/ Kale D. Gans_______ 
 KALE D. GANS 








CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 1st day of November, 2016, served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an 
electronic copy to: 
 
 BRIAN R. DICKSON 
 DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 




 __/s/ Kale D. Gans________ 
      KALE D. GANS 
Deputy Attorney General 
KDG/dd 
